I just picked up a copy of "MH370, Mystery Solved," by Larry Vance, published just this year. Vance was a crash investigator for the Canadian government for more than 30 years, lead investigator in more than 200 crashes and assisted in several hundreds more. Significantly, he was lead investigator in the crash of
Swiss Air 111, an MD-11 that crashed into the North Atlantic off Nova Scotia after multiple system failures left the pilots with too narrow of a margin for error and they lost control. I refer to it as 'significant' because uncontrolled crashes into the sea are infrequent, so this the Swiss Air crash gave Vance the rare opportunity to go to school on the clues presented when such a crash happens. By all accounts he is one of the world's preeminent air crash investigators.
I think in an earlier post I linked to
this video from an Australian 60 Minutes television show first aired in 2016. Mr. Vance is featured several times in it. In this film he covers analysis of the flap and flaperon, and his conclusion was exactly the same then as now. There have been additional pieces of wreckage from other areas of the aircraft recovered as well but the evidence from none of them contradicts Vance's earlier conclusion.
By the time of the 60 Minutes episode Vance already had had subject matter experts examine the flap and flaperon and they determined that both showed damage consistent with being in the extended position during a water landing. The flaps can't be extended unless
both of two conditions are met: 1) someone moves the flap selector switch in the cockpit and 2) the flap actuating hydraulic system is pressurized. And there's no hydraulic power available unless at least one engine is operating. So there definitely was a functioning hand in the cockpit, probably with a similarly functioning pilot attached to it, and there still was fuel in the tanks.
So it didn't run out of fuel and crash, a pilot landed it (at least somewhat) softly on the water.
Before you go there, no, the loss of one engine
will not force a commercial aircraft to land. All multiengine commercial aircraft must be able to continue to climb even if one engine fails at the instant it leaves the runway on takeoff, the point of flight at which the a/c is at its heaviest. Climbing requires thrust in excess of what is required to maintain level flight, so the loss of the thrust from one engine will not force a commercial a/c to land.
Vance also makes a big to-do of what he calls "the first anomaly," referring to the loss of response from MH370's transponder. Because a functioning transponder, which essentially is a wireless transmitter that broadcasts with an self-identifying code whenever swept by radar, makes an aircraft "visible" at distances far beyond those at which it could be seen entirely by radar signal bouncing off it and returning to the transmitter (known as the "primary return").
So switching a transponder off is just the sort of thing you'd do if you were preparing to disappear an airplane. Even if it malfunctions or catches fire, there's a spare transponder powered from a separate electrical circuit, so loss of the primary is no excuse for losing signal.
One minute and six seconds after MH370's final radio transmission, someone turned off the transponder and failed to switch on the back-up. The recording of that transmission still exists. There was no smoke alarm sounding and no indication of stress in the pilot's voice, and it is not possible that a battery fire in the cargo hold -- which has its own independent fire detection and suppression system -- could begun after the transmission, spread to the cockpit and disabled the transponder in so brief a time. Roughly two minutes after the transponder was switched off, MH370 reversed course and flew back over Malaysia.
Fifty-odd minutes later, military radar spotted MH370 well off-course, heading roughly WNW off the north end of Indonesia. That was the last time it was known to have been in radar contact.
Not quite seven hours after take-off, computers in MH370's Rolls Royce jet engines communicated with a maintenance company's satellite over the Indian ocean. Analysis indicated that that response came from somewhere roughly to the west of Australia, more than 2000 nautical miles south of Malaysia. This occurred more than one and one-half hours after the fight's scheduled time of arrival in Beijing, so MH370 would have been running on fumes. The RR engines where scheduled to check in again after another hour later but did not.
The forensic evidence from the flap and flaperon has direct implications to the cause of the "first anomaly." Because if MH370 was deliberately landed in the ocean after more than seven hours of controlled flight but before fuel exhaustion, there can be little doubt but that a pilot both turned off the transponder and flew the plane off-course.
Vance also goes through the alternate theories, at least the credible ones (he didn't waste time discounting CNN's resident idiot Don Lemon's "black hole" theory) and points out where each fails to satisfy some uncontested fact. The rogue pilot theory -- and only the rogue pilot theory -- fits with all the uncontested facts without any massaging.
He makes no effort to implicate either pilot but since the captain's home flight simulator bore evidence that he had rehearsed a flight path similar to that which MH370 is known to have flown, he suggests that it also is possible that whoever ditched the plane might also have studied the topography of the ocean floor and selected a landing location that specifically would make discovery of the airplane less likely, some place deep and rugged.
I paraphrase the author's "Summing Up" rather than quote to avoid copyright issues (page 299 in the eBook). The only possible scenario that satisfies all of the accepted 'facts' is that of a pilot deliberately flying the jet off-course. He adds that the official investigated concluded differently, that MH370 fell victim to fuel exhaustion while flying unpiloted, but Vance suggests they appear to have been trying to force their conclusion on facts that do not support it.
The book is written very much like an accident investigation report, dry and clinical, primarily a lengthy list of facts and diagrams accompanied by explanation, but Vance does offer some few "opinions," which probably are better characterised as the deductions of an experienced investigator. He thinks the pilot endeavoured to ditch in the ocean with as little damage as possible because doing so would minimize the size of the debris field, which also would lessen the possibility of the crash site ever being discovered. His team collected more than two million pieces of debris from Swiss Air 111, which is one reason he is unequivocal in stating that MH370, with fewer than 30 pieces of debris ever having been found, and with two of those pieces bearing witness to a controlled water landing, had to have performed a reasonably successful ditching in the ocean.
And since no one yet has found the werckage, the rest of the plan also seems to be working.