PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Only one conclusion follows from SCA’s efforts to force Relators into a “re- convened” arbitration: SCA is attempting to undo a settlement agreement and resulting consent award. Its effort to accomplish this result is not based on any recognized ground for vacating an award, but on strained allegations that it is seeking “sanctions” for conduct that took place during the original arbitration and “forfeiture” based on a bare allegation that cycling authorities have required it.
Rewarding SCA’s contrived arbitration strategy—formulated only after it became clear that its court case would fail—will set a dangerous precedent. Arbitration awards thought to be final will be revisited upon the discovery of “new” evidence contradicting the claimant’s position. Rather than promote the policy favoring arbitration, SCA’s position undercuts it. Instead of providing a quick method for resolving claims, arbitrations would continue indefinitely if parties can escape a final settlement and resulting arbitration award by recasting the claims they gave up as requests for “sanctions,” without following specific statutory procedures for vacating arbitration awards. Moreover, adopting SCA’s position would thwart other recognized and equally important legislative policies. This Court should grant mandamus to prevent this absurd result.
ARGUMENT
I. On This Record, the Ability to Challenge the Result of an Improperly Re-convened Arbitration Does Not Provide Relators an Adequate Remedy at Law
SCA tries to sidestep the thorny issues presented in Relators’ mandamus petition by cutting straight to the second prong of the general test for mandamus relief: the non-existence of an adequate appellate remedy. See Response at 10-18. In doing so, SCA misreads the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gulf Exploration, LLC as “clos[ing] the door to mandamus review of orders compelling arbitration or denying a stay of arbitration.” See Reply at 11-12. As later decisions from this Court illustrate, that is simply untrue in exceptional cases like this one.
A. None of SCA’s Cases Involve an Order Denying a Motion to Stay Arbitration
At the outset, it bears mention that SCA has not cited a single case expressly holding that a party has an adequate remedy at law when the trial court has denied a motion to stay arbitration, as opposed to granting a motion to compel arbitration. The supreme court has indicated that an order compelling arbitration under the FAA can be reviewed on appeal from a final confirmation judgment. See In re Gulf Explor., 289 S.W.3d 836, 842 (Tex. 2009) (citing Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 586 & n.9 (Tex. 2008)). However, by permitting post-arbitrationposition would thwart other recognized and equally important legislative policies. This Court should grant mandamus to prevent this absurd result.
ARGUMENT
I. On This Record, the Ability to Challenge the Result of an Improperly Re-convened Arbitration Does Not Provide Relators an Adequate Remedy at Law
SCA tries to sidestep the thorny issues presented in Relators’ mandamus petition by cutting straight to the second prong of the general test for mandamus relief: the non-existence of an adequate appellate remedy. See Response at 10-18. In doing so, SCA misreads the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gulf Exploration, LLC as “clos[ing] the door to mandamus review of orders compelling arbitration or denying a stay of arbitration.” See Reply at 11-12. As later decisions from this Court illustrate, that is simply untrue in exceptional cases like this one.
A. None of SCA’s Cases Involve an Order Denying a Motion to Stay Arbitration
At the outset, it bears mention that SCA has not cited a single case expressly holding that a party has an adequate remedy at law when the trial court has denied a motion to stay arbitration, as opposed to granting a motion to compel arbitration. The supreme court has indicated that an order compelling arbitration under the FAA can be reviewed on appeal from a final confirmation judgment. See In re Gulf Explor., 289 S.W.3d 836, 842 (Tex. 2009) (citing Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 586 & n.9 (Tex. 2008)). However, by permitting post-arbitration