In responce to the Armstrong tactics, etc. debate:
Well, let's put it this way, classics racing requires much more spontaneous and intuitive reactions to the visual data (terrain and bunch dynamics), to be able to win, and is absolutely unforgiving (since you only get one chance to get it right) in terms of missreadings and the bad luck (flat or crash or both) factor.
For whatever reasons, American racers, and not just Armstrong, have mostly been out-schooled in these regards by their Euro counterparts. Probably, though, cause the Euros are just more savey and sly. One must be sly in these races. In regards to the physical demands of classics racing a rider also has to be explosive and resistent to both the distance and the multiple attacks of his competitors, while being savey enough (and this is where Armstrong often came up short) to go at the right moment and ride the rest off your wheel and into the ground alla Bartoli in the 96 Liege. Or else, if it comes down to a sprint, be the fastest obviously (which is why Hincapie lost that Roubaix to Boonen). Often a rider's bravura, guts and determination as well as being able to ride himself into the ground pays well. The classics rider has to have balls and be super intuitive in his tactical sense, and of course lots of gas in the motor.
By contrast, grand tour tactics requires methodic and sustained consistancy, where long term planning and stress management (both physical and mental) is required to do well, if not win. This has obviously suited Armstrong, who, by all accounts is an obsessive planner and detail oriented guy (but also a control freak). And unless you make a major mistake, but even this is mostly eliminated today by the team radios, you have a chance to make amends. Physically, of course, you have to be a diesel, a Mecedes Benz rather than a Ferrari, and you're not allowed to have a bad day. The grand tour riders are the real strongmen of the sport even if jacked. If not the best climber than you must be among the top three. Usually at the Tour you also have to be the best time trialist, or at least if more the climber pull a great time trial out of your a$$ when it counts. For a while Armstrong was both the best climber and time trialist, so tactics played less a decisive role then say when Lemond won his three Tours, each having been a major tactical duel between Hinault, Fignon and Chiappuci respectively.
Armstrong also created the perfect tour machine, his team, which with pure strength (also due to excellent blood doping) kept the pace so high (even in the mountains with guys like Hincapie arriving at the last summit droping serious climbers - how rediculous was that!), that the only "tactic" was for Armstrong to sprint up to the finish. On the other hand, his tired act to fool Ullrich at Alpe d'Huez was a rare instance of pure savey, to his credit.
Consequently the two styled events, one short and explosive, the other a long military campaign where battles may be won or lost, but not necessarily the war, require different styled tactics. And there's no doubt that Armstrong was a good "tactician" in terms of the latter styled event, not so good though in the former.
The real irony here, is that he probably was a born classics rider, but was much more suited to the tactical style of the Tour. And after he hooked up with Bruyneel and Ferrari and whoever else after that, they created a new "corporate-tailored" man and team to just crush the competition at the Tour. It was a great plan, which worked, even if I never liked much of what I saw or what was going on behind the scenes to arrive at what I saw. In fact Armstrong's and Bruyneel's goal was to eliminate the tactical and spontaneity factors as much as possible, which makes for much more entertaining racing, because it was convenient for them and because they had the methodology to do it properly, by having Lance just crush everybody in the first time trial and mountain stage, gaining enough time in the first 10 days of the event to basically annihilate the race. From a pure convenient point of view, it was the best thing for them to do, but it took all the romance and tactical posturing out of the Tour during that streak.
And now Alberto has gotten caught up in their scheme is an inconvenient stud in the midst of their plans to have Lance win his 8th Tour.
Well, let's put it this way, classics racing requires much more spontaneous and intuitive reactions to the visual data (terrain and bunch dynamics), to be able to win, and is absolutely unforgiving (since you only get one chance to get it right) in terms of missreadings and the bad luck (flat or crash or both) factor.
For whatever reasons, American racers, and not just Armstrong, have mostly been out-schooled in these regards by their Euro counterparts. Probably, though, cause the Euros are just more savey and sly. One must be sly in these races. In regards to the physical demands of classics racing a rider also has to be explosive and resistent to both the distance and the multiple attacks of his competitors, while being savey enough (and this is where Armstrong often came up short) to go at the right moment and ride the rest off your wheel and into the ground alla Bartoli in the 96 Liege. Or else, if it comes down to a sprint, be the fastest obviously (which is why Hincapie lost that Roubaix to Boonen). Often a rider's bravura, guts and determination as well as being able to ride himself into the ground pays well. The classics rider has to have balls and be super intuitive in his tactical sense, and of course lots of gas in the motor.
By contrast, grand tour tactics requires methodic and sustained consistancy, where long term planning and stress management (both physical and mental) is required to do well, if not win. This has obviously suited Armstrong, who, by all accounts is an obsessive planner and detail oriented guy (but also a control freak). And unless you make a major mistake, but even this is mostly eliminated today by the team radios, you have a chance to make amends. Physically, of course, you have to be a diesel, a Mecedes Benz rather than a Ferrari, and you're not allowed to have a bad day. The grand tour riders are the real strongmen of the sport even if jacked. If not the best climber than you must be among the top three. Usually at the Tour you also have to be the best time trialist, or at least if more the climber pull a great time trial out of your a$$ when it counts. For a while Armstrong was both the best climber and time trialist, so tactics played less a decisive role then say when Lemond won his three Tours, each having been a major tactical duel between Hinault, Fignon and Chiappuci respectively.
Armstrong also created the perfect tour machine, his team, which with pure strength (also due to excellent blood doping) kept the pace so high (even in the mountains with guys like Hincapie arriving at the last summit droping serious climbers - how rediculous was that!), that the only "tactic" was for Armstrong to sprint up to the finish. On the other hand, his tired act to fool Ullrich at Alpe d'Huez was a rare instance of pure savey, to his credit.
Consequently the two styled events, one short and explosive, the other a long military campaign where battles may be won or lost, but not necessarily the war, require different styled tactics. And there's no doubt that Armstrong was a good "tactician" in terms of the latter styled event, not so good though in the former.
The real irony here, is that he probably was a born classics rider, but was much more suited to the tactical style of the Tour. And after he hooked up with Bruyneel and Ferrari and whoever else after that, they created a new "corporate-tailored" man and team to just crush the competition at the Tour. It was a great plan, which worked, even if I never liked much of what I saw or what was going on behind the scenes to arrive at what I saw. In fact Armstrong's and Bruyneel's goal was to eliminate the tactical and spontaneity factors as much as possible, which makes for much more entertaining racing, because it was convenient for them and because they had the methodology to do it properly, by having Lance just crush everybody in the first time trial and mountain stage, gaining enough time in the first 10 days of the event to basically annihilate the race. From a pure convenient point of view, it was the best thing for them to do, but it took all the romance and tactical posturing out of the Tour during that streak.
And now Alberto has gotten caught up in their scheme is an inconvenient stud in the midst of their plans to have Lance win his 8th Tour.
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