Thanks, Kennf, for the link to LA's response, and for other links you provided yesterday.
I guess I disagree with Mark. I'm no lawyer, but I think this is a much better crafted statement than the preceding ones submitted by LA’s team (granted, the bar had been set pretty low). Yes, there is a lot of repetition, but there are also a lot of precedents cited. Not being a lawyer, I can't judge how applicable they are. There are two main arguments:
1) USADA (and WADA and USAC) is ultimately bound by UCI anti-Doping Rules (ADR): “USADA…jurisdiction in cycling matters is defined and limited by the UCI ADR and the WADA code.”
2) The Ted Stevens Sports Act applies only to amateur athletes, not professional ones, and that even if that were not the case, the jurisdictional issue here is fundamental.
So the second claim is that the issue of jurisdiction is indeed an appropriate matter for the court to address, and the first claim is that the jurisdiction priority clearly belongs to UCI.
Wrt the first point, they argue that the WADA code acknowledges that “results management and hearings are the responsibility of and shall be governed by the procedural rules of the Anti-Doping Organization that initiated and directed sample collection”. They further note that in its original June 12 charging letter, USADA itself identified the UCI ADR as the only basis for its jurisdiction. Now, they charge, USADA is trying to change that, saying its claims are also based on rules of USADA, USAC and USOC.
UCI claims its rules have precedence and jurisdiction for four reasons:
1) The charges involve samples collected by UCI
2) UCI discovered the facts giving rise to doping allegations – the Landis confession was made to USAC, which is bound by the UCI ADR.
3) UCI had results management at the time of the violations. UCI did not sign on to WADA until 2004, and “USADA has not identified any specific alleged conduct by Mr. Armstrong after Aug 13 2004 that constitutes an alleged doping violation.” (seem to ignore the 09/10 passport data here)
4) UCI has not authorized USADA to proceed
In addition to these four main arguments, they list three related others:
5) UCI has jurisdiction because WADA’s own “rules of precedence” specifically state that that it has results management in this circumstances
6) There is no rule or possibility of charging a doping conspiracy: “UCI rules do not recognize the existence of an anti-doping violation for participation in an alleged doping conspiracy…Nor do they permit a consolidated action against multiple individuals.”
7) The Tygart affidavit in the SCA case is not relevant to the jurisdictional issue.
Comment: Others here have pointed out that the results management jurisdiction claim is undercut by the fact that most of the case is based not on sample tests but on witness testimony. It has also been argued here that the discovery claim—Landis confessed to USAC, which is under UCI jurisdiction—is countered by USADA’s argument that their case was proceeding before and to a large extent without the help of, Landis. USADA might have to provide some evidence of that. Likewise, LA is claiming that the witness testimony preceded the date at which UCI agreed to USADA testing; evidence bearing for or against that might be necessary.
With regard to point 2, they claim that the Sports Act only applies to amateur athletes, and even if that were not the case, it would not matter, because LA is only challenging on the basis of due process. They cite precedents in which the courts can decide whether an organization is following its own rules: “Mr. Armstrong seeks only to enforce the governing rules of UCI (and the WADA code) and to require USADA to abide by those rules.”
They also dismiss the USADA argument that LA needs to exhaust all administrative remedies first, since he is challenging the very validity of USADA to pursue a case against him. They cite a case supporting this, and argue that if LA submitted to USADA arbitration, he would waive the right to challenge jurisdiction later. They conclude by claiming LA never signed a specific agreement with USADA, and under these circumstances it is the proper role of the court to determine whether the agreement is in fact binding.
Comment: At the very least, LA's team has thrown a wrench into the machine, hoping it will stop it. If they can convince the judge that USADA might not be following the applicable rules, then they can at least get him to take the jurisdictional issue seriously. Though it may be established that due process does not apply to non-state actors like USADA and UCI, they still have to adhere to their own rules. Whether their case is very good or not I will leave up to others to decide, but this is a better approach than trying to claim USADA is a state actor (they do in fact maintain that, but also emphasize it doesn't matter to their argument).