MarkvW said:
I've got to look at again. It's fundamental, though, that once a federal court determines that it has no jurisdiction, it only has authority to announce that fact and stop. I'll look at it again.
MacRoadie said:
Fair enough. Take a look at the second paragraph on Page 18 as well. It reads, in toto:
I've read through your various exchanges on the subject of the meaning and effect of the court's ruling, and I have to say you're both right and both wrong.
To the extent one or both of you have said the Court's judgment is broad and that the court ruled on the due process claims, well, it's certainly true that the court
analyzed those claims, commented upon them, and also determined that they were without merit
for a number of reasons.
But likewise, the actual order of the court really was limited just to the language contained in the two-page "Order" of Dismissal that the judge signed yesterday, in which it was "ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the above-styled cause is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and that Plaintiff Lance Armstrong shall bear all costs of suit, for which let execution issue."
The latter quoted material is the actual order in the case. The rest of the material was simply the background, the reasoning, the court's analysis of the claims, the law and the evidence presented by the parties concerning the claims.
MacRoadie is right that the judge did analyze far more than just whether the court itself had subject matter jurisdiction, but it did so I think for the same reasons that it also noted that it was electing not to exercise equitable jurisdiction to the extent it was wrong on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
And interestingly, it is that decision to avoid exercising equitable jurisdiction that could, if Armstrong appeals, provide the most fertile ground for a reversal by the 5th Circuit, if that appellate court were so inclined or persauded. Specifically, the paragraph that I'm thinking of is at Page 12, immediately preceding the "Analysis" section, in which the Court writes:
"With respect to Armstrong's due process challenges, the Court agrees they are without merit and therefore dismisses them without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court further agrees the Sports Act and Armstrong's arbitration agreement preclude his remaining claims, and the Court therefore dismisses those claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, even if the Court has jurisdiction over Armstrong's remaining claims, the Court finds they are best resolved through the well-established system of international arbitration, by those with expertise in the field, rather than by the unilateral edict of a single nation's courts; the Court thus declines to grant equitable relief on Armstrong's remaining claims on this alternative basis."
First--and at least one person her who has been critical of my prior takes on the court's reading of subject matter jurisdiction will appreciate this-- I think the court does conclusively state that applying the 12(b)(6) standard and Iqbal/Twombley rules of pleading, Armstrong's due process claims fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The court dismissed the action though not on the merits of the claims (because, as Mark correctly notes, the court is not conducting a hearing on the merits, but only based on the grounds asserted in USADA's motion to dismiss, which was 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1)-- but rather because the claims cannot, as a matter of law be stated, either because they are preempted, or because there are adequate "due process" safeguards built into the arbitration process, or because they are preempted by the Stevens Act, which itself requires that the parties submit to arbitration.
I think the source of the confusion is when the court states the claims "have no merit" or they are "without merit." In the context of this motion, that of course means that they cannot be asserted because (a) the court has no subject matter jurisdiction, (b) the Stevens Act preempts such claims and requires them to be arbitrated first, and (c) the arbitration process itself as described in the rules meets the basic standards for due process. But saying they "lack merit" and therefore cannot be brought because they do not satisfy 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) is far different from saying that the claims can
never be asserted.
And as to the latter point, I think the court very clearly states that
if the procedural steps outlined in the Federal Arbitration Act, the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules (which apply to USADA hearings) and the rest of the USADA Protocols are not adhered to, and if the USADA monkeys around or fails to provide Armstrong with the things it said it would provide, (i.e., sufficient advance notice of the evidence and testimony to be offered so that the defendant can prepare an adequate defense, etc.,), Judge Sparks clearly did not preclude Armstrong from re-filing a new case to assert that the USADA ought to be enjoined or restrained if it turns out that its conduct in the hearing is violative of the athlete's rights to a fair and impartial hearing. That is the principal reason why, in my view, the Court granted the motion, but did so "without prejudice." That latter term, "without prejudice" is a term of art in the law, and it has a defined and precise meaning: It essentially means that the ruling being entered by the court is only conclusive as to the precise matters that were before the court at that moment, and that the court is not foreclosing the party it is ruling against from later bringing the same or similar claims if there are suifficient facts to warrant such a claim.
Anyway, that's my take on it, for what its worth. Judge Sparks was clearly expressing his opinion as to many of the claims asserted, many of the comments that were addressed to him during oral argument. The ultimate meaning of his remarks should be self-evident and plain, and so is his ruling and the legal effect of that ruling, as well as its limitations. It is not so broad as to serve as a complete bar to any further judicial intervention if the facts and circumstances ultimately merit further judicial intervention, but likewise, as to the specific claims alleged in this lawsuit, it's definitive and clear that those claims are dismissed. The reasoning and analysis as to "why" the court did what it did may or may not have persausive effects and implications in some future litigation involving other athletes, but it is not binding authority, and thus is not really considered "precedent". It can be cited by others as persausive authority in other similar cases, but no other federal district court judge is bound, as a matter of law, to follow Judge Sparks' reasoning and rationale, nor are they bound by the outcome in this case.