Identity-Based Distinctions
The second pillar of the Court’s opinion is its assertion that “the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s . . . identity.” Ante, at 30; accord, ante, at 1, 24, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 49, 50.
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The Government routinely places special restrictions on the speech rights of students, (41) prisoners, (42) members of the Armed Forces,(43) foreigners,
(44) and its own employees.(45) When such restrictions are justified by a legitimate governmental interest, they do not necessarily raise constitutional problems.(46)
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More pertinently, it would appear to afford the same protection to multinational corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual Americans: To do otherwise, after all, could “‘enhance the relative voice’” of some (i.e., humans) over others (i.e., nonhumans).
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In short, the Court dramatically overstates its critique of identity-based distinctions, without ever explaining why corporate identity demands the same treatment as individual identity. Only the most wooden approach to the First Amendment could justify the unprecedented line it seeks to draw.
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Unlike voters in U. S. elections, corporations may be foreign controlled.(70) Unlike other interest groups, business corporations have been “effectively
delegated responsibility for ensuring society’s economic welfare”;(71) they inescapably structure the life of every citizen.