Well, the other thing is that Israel probably have more invested in salaries and so on for next year at this stage as well as being more dependent on their WT status than Lotto I guess, Lotto do at least have the ability to fight back via the large number of French, Belgian and Dutch smaller races if they really go nuts on them, like Vacansoleil did in 2010 but I can imagine that they can fall back on the domestic and regional races to their sponsors more readily than Israel-PremierTech.
Whoever got into the danger zone, they were always likely to challenge it though; given the years it was covering, the number of cancelled races in 2020 and 2021, the way being based in or having riders located in particular towns or countries significantly impacted rider availability and indeed riders' ability to train and hold form, and rider withdrawals from races enforced by Covid that could award free points to other teams (as well as other circumstances outside of teams' control like the cancellation of the Tour of Britain), meaning that teams didn't have the same level of control over their own destiny that they would in an ordinary period.
At the same time, I do have some sense that, you know, lots of these teams have chosen to go a different way around resolving the problem and it seems Adams' group have been somewhat caught out. BikeExchange and Lotto have farmed points at small races. EF to a lesser extent, but they've also spammed breakaways and targeted a few races that other teams aren't travelling to. Movistar have buried their heads in the sand pretending it won't happen to them until very late in the day, but have now doubled down on Mas at the Vuelta and started scattergunning their top riders around everywhere possible to pick up points. ISN got into a very poor position and while yes, some of the issues like Hagen crashing out of the Vuelta GC right at the start is unfortunatey, they also had the problem that they'd spent a lot of money on the likes of Froome who were not contributing points at anything like the level they would have been hoping for when he was signed, and so this limited their options to respond to the points crisis unless they threw even more money at the problem, with things like the Dylan Teuns transfer being a desperation move and only coming when they were already well down on 19th place, and I think they've done too little too late; Movistar reacted too slowly but they seemingly had enough banked that once they took action they could do enough fairly quickly (plus getting that huge slice of fortune in Britain of course, handing Serrano 200 points and moving him into their top 10), but Lotto and BEX were taking action way before Israel recognised the need to.
That’s interesting—I didn’t think of that perspective.
Well, at the same time, you've got to look at the enormous parallel shrinking away of investment in the ProTeam level. It has been something of a PremierLeagueification of the sport, there's now more investment in the top level, but it's then concentrated all of the talent into a small number of teams and reduced the ProTeams to largely being irrelevant break fodder with only one or two teams as exceptions, whereas if you look at the late 2000s/early 2010s you can see a large number of very competitive ProConti teams who were contributing favourites to every Classic (this is the one area they do compete similarly here, with Mathieu van der Poel) and almost every major stage race, with the likes of Voeckler, Scarponi, Garzelli, Marcato, Mosquera, Sastre, di Luca, Petacchi, Visconti, Hoogerland, Pozzovivo, Leukemans, Carrara, de Waele, Tondó, Hushovd, Haussler, Moncoutié, Taaramäe, Keukeleire, Evans, Hincapie, Ballan, Kristoff and Rujano all riding at that level in a short period of time.