python said:
the degree of sophistication to manipulate blood, of course, was not a fixed skill. it was linked directly to the anti-(blood) doping environment prevalent in the sport at the time. simply put, the skills had to and did evolve according to the lowering haemoglobin limit - from the insane 18.5 and downward... that is, the early 90s techniques were different from the slightly more involved late 90's technique. on a technical level, this involved adjusting epo doses and frequency, selecting an appropriate plasma volume expander (saline, modified starches, glycerine...), developing individual responses for such de-hydrating factors like altitude stay, kidney affecting meds and supplements etc..
it must be noted that fis was slightly, but still ahead of the downright corrupt uci in applying and enforcing the controls. the biggest difference was fis' earlier adherence to a more stable manipulation marker like haemoglobin vs. haematocrit and, if memory serves me, fis' one year (?) earlier introduction of blood screens and profiling.
overall, though, beating these controls was very easy. if any one was flagged, it wound be likely due to negligence, sloppiness or such. a highly organized, professionally overseen national team ran much lower risk of getting busted. both norway and sweden certainly fit the bill. the russians much less so. they were busted more frequently, at least in part, due fracturing and disintegration of the formally centralized state and its doping machine...
Very interesting. And such an argument would mesh with the huge organizational changes in Norwegian XC skiing in 1998-1999. If one buys the argument that there were systematic or semi-systematic doping in Norway at the time, the medical staff would surely have to be involved. But the entire staff was changed prior to that season, which could help explain a number of mishaps in blood testing. And the season overall was a catastrophe for the male skiers; Ramsau was a fiasco (but likely due mostly to illness). In terms of the World Cup as well, Norway failed miserably. With one exception, that is, because Bjørn Dæhlie was the overall winner. But then again, he mostly did his own, indivdual things that season, and he kept Ola Rønsen, the previous chief team doctor, as his personal doctor.
As regards plasma volume expanders of various sorts, I guess your point is that the use of those (across nations) varied with the introduction of "health" screening starting in early 1997. One interesting question is still whether or not such devices were used prior to that year (again, across nations, I don't mean Norway specifically). If so, what was the logic behind that?
Of course, one logically sound reason for using plasma expanders early on was the fact that FIS did introduce blood tests from 1989. Smart people would then think long-term, acknowleding that sky-high blood values, if they came to light later, would do significant damage to the reputation of those skiers who were doped. But obviously, many didn't care. Smirnov's 19.8 from Thunder Bay is a case in point, as is Silvio Fauner's 19.2 from Lahti 1997. The latter seems kind of strange considering that the Italians could draw on top-level expertise in the form of Conconi. Smirnov's case is not too strange, though, because he couldn't possibly have an organization of any size or particular competence covering his back.
As for the rest of the skiers, I'm wondering. Of course, if one got hold of the blood values from the 1990s (FIS has still got several hundreds of them), analyzing them could be a little tricky if plasma expanders were used by some teams. But I'm not really into these technical-medical issues.
What I do know, of course, is that volume plasma epanders did become a huge issue again (after Lahtis 2001) in late 2002, when Norwegian TV Channel TV2 aired the documentary about possible Norwegian doping during the Olympics in Lillehammer. Long story short: the documentary (which TV2 had to remove from all archives soon after the airing) seemed to have focused on three things: (1) the meeting between Johann Olav Koss/Ådne Søndrål and Conconi/Moser; (2) the ordering of some 180 different medicines etc. by the Norwegians, including stuff that was banned (the program made a huge mistake, though, as they had apparently mixed two different list; the "correct" one included only two banned substances). (3) The "disappearance" of 72 liters of plasma expanders (Macrodex), enough to mask EPO use for about 100 athletes, it was reckoned.
The responsible medics at the time (including not least Inggard Lereim, who was chief of overall medical issues at Lillehammer) claimed that the Macrodex was ordered in case there were huge emergencies at Lillehammer, such as that of a big train crash or stadium collapse.
That claim was not necessarily implausible. If one is to claim otherwise, however, meaning that the Macrodex was used to cover traces of EPO use, that means that masking blood manipulation was an "established" practice even before FIS introduced these health screening.
To me, who has no real knowledge of this, of course, both these hypotheses do have some logical merit. Which makes it a little bit confusing. But fun at the same time. A lot of similar hypotheses involving XC skiing and doping also have at least equally plausible counter-hypotheses attached. Such as stone-grounded skis, or high-altitude training.
In any case, I'm just wondering about the timing of the introduction of EPO-masking devices. Smirnov didn't care, and likely didn't have anyone around him who cared. But the Norwegians might have cared more. Until Arne Vilberg became chief doctor, that is... (the last comment was in part a joke)
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