Nuclear disaster in Japan and wider Nuclear discussion

[Le breton]

You gotta link for that?

It could have been OLIVIER GUPTA speaking as we hear him a lot on the radio. He is with
http://www.asn.fr/

 

[python]

It could have been OLIVIER GUPTA speaking as we hear him a lot on the radio. He is with
http://www.asn.fr/

perhaps i'm wrong, but if it's not in arabic or english (which it was not) perhaps skandar akhbar wont understand your link.


a better clue to the 'french connection' would be france's uniquely safe and unparalleled nuclear record:

- the highest in the world percentage (70-75%) of any nation's electrical demand satisfied by a nuclear option
- as safe or safer than any nation using the nuclear power option
- a uniqum among the democratic western nations -- a national consensus about the nuclear option
- good business exporting electricity to eu neighbours whilst they cut their own nuclear plants..

if not to envy, at least something to look into.

 

[I Watch Cycling In July]

You probably can find in many places that the current seismic resistance requirement for nuclear power plants is based on 7.5 magnitude earthquakes. In France it is 6.5.

Some big shot, sorry can't remember his name, from either the French CEA or the appropriate governmental authority was explaining on France-inter yesterday that this was for an earthquake at the location of the plant and that they applied a factor 5 on top ( As far as I know a factor 3 on top of everything is standard practice for civil engineering for bridges, buildings, anything).

The wording of these ideas may be too loose for civil or structural engineers, but I think the central point you make is very important. A magnitude 9.0 earthquake centered 150 km away is not as bad as a 9.0 located 20km below your feet. A 7.5 quake at 10km deep, could cause greater ground accelerations accelerations directly above it, than a 9.0 centered 150km away at 20km depth.

Anyone who doubts this can compare the instrument intensity for the 9.0 in Japan with the instrument intensity of the recent 6.3 in NZ. (NZ peak ground acceleration data in more detail here.)

Peak ground acceleration is not the only design consideration, but it is an important one. The tsunami was a worst case scenario, resulting from the largest possible shallow earthquake. However, I believe it's wrong to view the shaking intensity experienced at individual locations within Japan as necessarily worst case scenario shaking. With few exceptions, structures and buildings withstood the quake, which suggests the shaking was within the design limits for areas of Japan affected. So why were there difficulties at multiple reactors? Why was the Fukushima plant and its backup power system located where it was vulnerable to a worst case scenario tsunami?

It seems simple to locate power plants and their backup systems high enough that there is no risk from even a worse case tsunami. The apparent failure to locate the power plant with the utmost caution, makes me wonder whether Japan's nuclear power plants may be under-designed in relation to seismic risks in general. This is a particular concern because the aftershock sequence from the 9.0 quake will be savage and it wont be over any time soon. Even if a disaster can be averted at Fukushima, there is a very real possibility that aftershocks above magnitude 7 will happen closer to population centers or nuclear reactors. The message that an aftershock can be worse than the main shake, if it's closer and shallower, has been just hammered home where I live. Finding words to describe how much I hope the worst is over for people in Japan is entirely beyond me.

 

[Skandar Akbar]

No need for me to understand the link because if the summary posted here is accurate then that guy and some of these recent posters don't have a clue about what they are talking about. They don't have a clue about desk studies that have been done relating to return periods, probability, proximity to faults, geotechnical considerations etc that go into developing peak ground acceleration maps and design loading for structures. That is why I asked for the link above because the" .....150 km away....." statement was absurd.

Of course I'm just a guy that owns a strip club and reads wikipedia so what do I know.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

That is ok Akbar that is how the snake gets all his info. Do not be troubled by the bad info. Trolling is the name of the game.

 

[python]

.. Japan's nuclear power plants have been under-designed for the risks posed by seismic activity.

every significant nuclear accident had it's own schedule of lessons learned. it usually takes years....

So, the seismic adequacy of the failed japanese plants and their ability to withstand the accompanying events remains to be analysed out.

what we can say already (with the reasonable assurance) is that the design basis accident model, as it was understood and applied during the plant's licensing, failed miserably.

in fact, the essential cooling systems ability to function after the unprecedented earthquake point to a different direction...it was NOT about the ground shaking per se but about the shaking causing the tsunami which in turn caused the station total black-out - loss of off-site power and the emergency power.

it was about what no nuclear plant ever put in their licensing papers - postulating an event beyond a design basis accident.

to be honest, those beyond design basis accident events are well known and expected, it's just that in this case they, as in virtually every other case, they were discounted,

wrongly so as we learned.

 

[python]

That is ok Akbar that is how the snake gets all his info. Do not be troubled by the bad info. Trolling is the name of the game.

that's not ok to waste a a serious thread by offtopic comments like this. waste is a form of trolling.

 

[I Watch Cycling In July]

No need for me to understand the link because if the summary posted here is accurate then that guy and some of these recent posters don't have a clue about what they are talking about. They don't have a clue about desk studies that have been done relating to return periods, probability, proximity to faults, geotechnical considerations etc that go into developing peak ground acceleration maps and design loading for structures. That is why I asked for the link above because the" .....150 km away....." statement was absurd.'...'

Perhaps the point was not well expressed and you simply misunderstood it. Since the points you appear to be arguing with were not about estimation of probable PGA based on proximity to faults or ground conditions, I suspect you have not understood what was intended.

Your posts seem to indicate that you are of the opinion that, for a given event, shaking intensity does not generally decrease as distance from the epicenter increases (local geotech considerations aside). Would care to contribute to the discussion by expanding on what you actually meant? (I'm giving you the benefit of the doubt here, based on the assumption that anyone who can simultaneously breath and use a keyboard can't be that stupid <edited by mod>.)

python, your reply is largely along the lines of what i was originally trying to say. I edited my post in a (probably futile) effort to be clearer

 

[python]

python, your reply is largely along the lines of what i was originally trying to say. I edited my post in a (probably futile) effort to be clearer

we are on the same page, july.

i was only extending your concern as you expressed it regarding the fukushima plants only into a more serious and wider perspective which i consider a major problem. the one dangerously common to the nuclear commercial industry at large - focusing only on a given set of accident scenarios called 'design basis accidents' and essentially sweeping aside the so called 'beyond design basis accidents'.

what we've seen at fukushima with apparently poor preparedness for the tsunami appears to me the result of that kind of flawed generic thinking.

the current licensing philosophy for all nuclear plants, regardless of the country, is based on heavy reliance on the so called probabilistic risk assessment (pra). it involves an applicant submitting a set of analysis for 'most probable accidents. the rest are simply not considered credible or considered enveloped by the other events. normally, common mode failures like due to an earthquake or a tsunami are not considered credible occurring concurrently with other accident initiating events.

i'm afraid, your example with the plant equipment location is the consequence of such thinking.

 

[GreasyMonkey]

we are on the same page, july.

The one dangerously common to the nuclear commercial industry at large - focusing only on a given set of accident scenarios called 'design basis accidents' and essentially sweeping aside the so called 'beyond design basis accidents'.

<snip>

I'm afraid, your example with the plant equipment location is the consequence of such thinking.

It is certainly not only in the nuclear power industry that has this mindset- it is commonplace thinking in the oil/gas industry, chemicals production and other power generation businesses, that I have witnessed first-hand.

Too often the obvious "single-point-of-failure" is ignored in the overall assessment of a risk, as there are other complicating factors which over-shadow these in the complex scenario's that are developed for the licensing/approvals process.

As an instructor of mine once said "there is never a single cause for a disaster, it is the massing of a number of probable causes, creating certainty (of a disaster)".

 

[Cobblestones]

A lot happened since last I checked in here. 'to hell in a handbasket' comes to mind.

Particularly troubling is that the spent fuel pond of reactor #4 is drained of water. Our NRC head said a couple of days ago that it was already empty which the Japanese denied. Hence the difference in evacuation zone for Japanese and Americans.

In that light the news of hydrogen in #4 is important. To make hydrogen, there has to be water. So the spent fuel pond cannot be entirely empty which is good news. On the other hand, to make hydrogen (by thermolysis, or oxidation of the zircalloy cladding) the rods have to (partially) stick out of the water with temperatures of several hundreds to one thousand degrees which is bad news (radiolysis could produce hydrogen as well but I doubt it could produce that much). And of course the hydrogen might explode rupturing rods or the pool itself which could lead to an even more grave situation.

When it comes to a fire in the spent fuel pond, we will have reached the level of a Chernobyl accident with widespread dissemination of radioactivity. If you look at the measurements of radioactivity, the highest level measured so far was three days ago after the fire in #4. There's no containment to speak of around the spent fuel pond, so a fire there would release large amounts of radioactivity straight into the atmosphere. With wind blowing toward Tokyo, it could be bad (not uninhabitable bad, but mass panic bad).

 

[flicker]

I heard on BBC today that radiation from the Japanese reactor may touch Southern California USA today, depending on weather patterns.

 

[on3m@n@rmy]

when it reaches Cali the risk should be minimal:
www.smh.com.au radiation-to-reach-us-today-but-risk-considered-minimal

 

[flicker]

when it reaches Cali the risk should be minimal:
www.smh.com.au radiation-to-reach-us-today-but-risk-considered-minimal

I am curious to know when the radiation that is scheduled to hit So-Cal was released from the plant? My immediate thought when the plant became hot was fallout hitting the West Coast of California.
It was further compounded when two days ago radiation monitoring equipment was installed in San Francisco.
My gut feeling is the radiation will be minimal in my area however it seems that weather patterns can isolate and concentrate fallout into a concentrated area. My main concern are children in the growth phase of life as radiation effects expanding cell growth....

 

[on3m@n@rmy]

I am curious to know when the radiation that is scheduled to hit So-Cal was released from the plant? My immediate thought when the plant became hot was fallout hitting the West Coast of California.
It was further compounded when two days ago radiation monitoring equipment was installed in San Francisco.
My gut feeling is the radiation will be minimal in my area however it seems that weather patterns can isolate and concentrate fallout into a concentrated area. My main concern are children in the growth phase of life as radiation effects expanding cell growth....

The first explosion of Fukushima's (spelling?) reactor #1 would have contained the first radioactive isotopes released (some Cs-137, Iodine, and daughters Argon, Krypton). The reason I say that is because it was just after the first explosion (of #1) that Cs-137 was reportedly detected. Correct me if I'm worng on the timing of when Cs was first detected. But Cs can only come from the fuel itself.

I agree the fallout to the west coast will be minimal under the present set of circumstances.

 

[Cobblestones]

My gut feeling is the radiation will be minimal in my area however it seems that weather patterns can isolate and concentrate fallout into a concentrated area.

That, and different types of food can concentrate certain elements even more. Cesium from Chernobyl is still a problem in wide parts of Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, but the release was much stronger then and those areas were much closer to the source than Cali is now. Don't panic and give your children iodine tablets (if you have any). The potential for side effects is much higher than the potential of adverse effects from the little radioactive iodine which reaches Cali.

 

[flicker]

That, and different types of food can concentrate certain elements even more. Cesium from Chernobyl is still a problem in wide parts of Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, but the release was much stronger then and those areas were much closer to the source than Cali is now. Don't panic and give your children iodine tablets (if you have any). The potential for side effects is much higher than the potential of adverse effects from the little radioactive iodine which reaches Cali.

Interesting you said that as it just started raining....hard.
I have no worry except when I get info from BBC instead of local news.
Little or non information is worrisome.

 

[Cobblestones]

That, and different types of food can concentrate certain elements even more. Cesium from Chernobyl is still a problem in wide parts of Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, but the release was much stronger then and those areas were much closer to the source than Cali is now. Don't panic and DON'T give your children iodine tablets (if you have any). The potential for side effects is much higher than the potential of adverse effects from the little radioactive iodine which reaches Cali.

Edited for clarity

ETA: must have clicked 'quote' instead of 'edit'. Sorry for the double post.

 

[usedtobefast]

not too worried yet here in Orange County, but you never know. i am reminded of a song on the first Mothers Of Invention album, "It Can't Happen Here"...
a cautionary tale if there ever was one.

 

[Le breton]

TEPCO's radiant future

Operator of Fukushima nuke plant admitted to faking repair records
AFP From: AFP March 20, 2011 6:33PM .........

DAYS before Japan plunged into an atomic crisis after a giant earthquake and tsunami knocked out power at the ageing Fukushima nuclear plant, its operator had admitted faking repair records.

The revelation raises fresh questions about both Tokyo, the scandal-tainted past of the Electric Power Co (TEPCO), and the Japanese government's perceived soft regulation of a key industry.The operator of the Fukushima No 1 plant submitted a report to the country's nuclear watchdog 10 days before the quake hit on March 11, admitting it had failed to inspect 33 pieces of equipment in its six reactors there.

A power board distributing electricity to a reactor's temperature control valves was not examined for 11 years, and inspectors faked records, pretending to make thorough inspections when in fact they were only cursory, TEPCO said.

It also said that inspections, which are voluntary, did not cover other devices related to cooling systems including water pump motors and diesel generators.
The report was submitted after the regulator ordered operators to examine whether inspections were suitably thorough.

"Long-term inspection plans and maintenance management were inadequate," the nuclear safety agency concluded in a follow-up report two days after TEPCO's admission.

"The quality of inspection was insufficient."

The safety agency ordered the operator to draw up a corrective plan by June 2.

But on March 11 the 9.0-magnitude earthquake unleashed a 10-metre tsunami, knocking out back-up generators hooked to the plant's cooling system aimed at keeping fuel rods from overheating and releasing dangerous radiation.

A nuclear safety agency official who declined to be named said: "We can't say that the lapses listed in the (February 28) report did not have an influence on the chain of events leading to this crisis."We will conduct thorough research on TEPCO's activities up until this crisis but that will come afterwards. For now we are only working on saving the plant."

Firefighters, policemen and troops are hosing the damaged reactors in a desperate bid to stop them overheating, and trying to restore electricity that would kick-start cooling systems.

Images of the exploding plant triggered global alarm, but for many in Japan, TEPCO's track record of safety issues and attempts to cover them up add to suspicion over a flow of opaque, erratic information about Fukushima.

In 2002, TEPCO admitted to falsifying safety reports which led to all 17 of its boiling-water reactors being shut down for inspection, including Fukushima.

The revelation forced the then TEPCO chairman and president to resign.

And in an eerily familiar event, a 2007 earthquake paralysed its Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear plant - the world's biggest - and more radiation leaked than TEPCO initially acknowledged.

TEPCO later said it underestimated the potential impact of an earthquake on the facility.

"People don't trust TEPCO, they don't expect TEPCO to tell the truth," Philip White of the Tokyo-based Citizens' Nuclear Information Centre, a group of scientists and activists against nuclear power, said.

"The problem is one of a culture of denial - denial that this could occur, denial Japan could be subject to a big quake and the scale of the wave that could come."

Parallels with how TEPCO has handled Fukushima and BP's dealing with the Gulf of Mexico oil spill disaster have been drawn.

TEPCO has lost 1.93 trillion yen ($A24.6 billion) in market value since the disaster.

Prime Minister Naoto Kan was heard by a stray microphone furiously berating TEPCO officials after they took an hour to notify the government of the first explosion to hit the plant.

"What the hell is going on?" Kan was heard to say.

When the February report was released, the local Fukushima government also demanded redress, saying the "problem threatens the foundation of trust", media reported at the time.

TEPCO had issued the report after a fresh inspection at its Kashiwazaki Kariwa plant also revealed oversight.

"They had submitted the report because they were afraid they would get in trouble if they didn't," another nuclear safety official said.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Tepco poor inspections caused the eartquake and tsunami. ****ing tepco

 

[Le breton]

Tepco poor inspections caused the eartquake and tsunami. ****ing tepco

Apparently you are annoyed by my post. Maybe you are a part owner of TEPCO.
Or maybe I am just lost in translation.

I am not sure who you are trying to ridicule, me or the AFP. What I know is that it will backfire.

Although I am in general pro-civil nuclear energy, I distrust the private sector when it comes to safety and maintenance issues. You would need pitbull-type regulatory agencies to watch over them, not NISA type agencies.

Don't know why you put the eart(h)quake and the tsunami on equal footings, I thought the tsunami was more to blame, but don't know (electric power).

Although Tepco, if I remember correctly, had been warned that their anti-seismic standards were out of date, I have not yet read any report stating that this had any incidence on the current disaster.

PS I checked the thread to see your earlier posts.
Hope your family and friends in Japan are all OK

 

[Clearly Unstable]

http://www.atomicinsights.blogspot.com/

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Apparently you are annoyed by my post. Maybe you are a part owner of TEPCO.
Or maybe I am just lost in translation.

I am not sure who you are trying to ridicule, me or the AFP. What I know is that it will backfire.

Although I am in general pro-civil nuclear energy, I distrust the private sector when it comes to safety and maintenance issues. You would need pitbull-type regulatory agencies to watch over them, not NISA type agencies.

Don't know why you put the eart(h)quake and the tsunami on equal footings, I thought the tsunami was more to blame, but don't know (electric power).

Although Tepco, if I remember correctly, had been warned that their anti-seismic standards were out of date, I have not yet read any report stating that this had any incidence on the current disaster.

PS I checked the thread to see your earlier posts.
Hope your family and friends in Japan are all OK

I just posted from my phone. Thus the EARTquake...Laughing at myself. I just thought the gist of your post was that if TEPCO would have done their due diligence then they would have not had a problem.

It is my thoughts that the earthquake which caused the Tsunami and then the TEPCO backup gen sets and other systems were wiped out.

I was finding your post interesting so I guess the blame game is on now?

My exwife and daughter are safe for now,,,, but It is tough to watch the news when I have something personal at stake. Thanks for the thoughts / words in your post.

 

[Le breton]

...............
I just thought the gist of your post was that if TEPCO would have done their due diligence then they would have not had a problem.
...........
.

Can't do anything about that. I was just relaying an item from a news agency because it was an important news item that did not seem to get the medias' attention.
The conclusion they would have not had a problem is totally your own, it certainly is not stated anywhere.

Maybe you gave more weight than deserved to this paragraph :

A nuclear safety agency official who declined to be named said: "We can't say that the lapses listed in the (February 28) report did not have an influence on the chain of events leading to this crisis."We will conduct thorough research on TEPCO's activities up until this crisis but that will come afterwards. For now we are only working on saving the plant."

But I guess I was myself reading in your message a personal attack that was not there.

Glad your ex-wife and daughter are fine.
Japan and Japanese do not deserve the likes of TEPCO.